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Article 11

Contraception and the Contralife Will
R. A. Connor

Father Connor received his Ph. D.
in philosophy from the Lateran University in Rome. He points out that
"Intending the good is a subjective
operation deriving from an intellectual objective perception of being.
The being that I perceive is the esse of
my personal self which is thrusting to
fulfillment through acts. The person
and his / her acts are the grounding of
what I mean by "good" or "bad". The
evil of contraception, then is not an
intention against the life of a future
child. but the nonconformity of the
will with the double structure (lovemaking / life giving) of the coital act
which is a manifestation of the
intercoursing process.
"The evident weakness of the contralife will shows in the inabilil.l' to
apply it uniformly throughout sexual morality. For example. in in vitro
fertilization. the will is pro-life. yet the "manufacturing" of the child is evil.
They then have recourse to other principles ad hoc."

John Ford, S.J., Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis and
William Mayl have given us a defense of"Humanae Vitae" by affirming the
evil of contraception to be the contra-life will against the future child 2 They
say: "We think . .. that while contraception is wrong for several reasons, it is
wrong primarily and essentially because it is contralife."3 I would like to
make a brief critique of that position suggesting that it is a disguised
subjectivism. The authors seem to have put the full burden of moral
evaluation on the intention of the will as contralife or prolife. I would like to
propose that the evaluation of the moral theory of"Humanae Vitae" would
be better served by a grounding in the objectivity of the Thomistic esse of
the person which would permit explaining, rather than bypassing, the
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reasoning put forth by "Humanae Vitae" itself in the non-separability
principle: love-making cannot be separated from life-giving.
I think clarity would be served better by a presentation of the
metaphysical position first. "Humanae Vitae" establishes its argument
against contraception on the inseparability principle: "each and every
marriage act (quilibet matrimonii usus) must remain open to the
transmission of life."4 I am not arguing here that the conclusions of
"Humanae Vitae" take their authority to demand assent from the
arguments therein. They do not. However, I would like to point out that the
argument which is used is an argument from the realism of nature, and the
being of persons and the acts that they engage in. I would also like to point
out that realism is an epistemological axiom which presumes the objectivity
of truth. It is intimately connected with the acknowledgment of a
transcendent God while at the same time being the grounding perspective of
Western civilization.s
Esse as Ground of the Good
Now, we should ask: what is the traditional realist argument with regard
to moral goodness? In the metaphysically grounded ethics of St. Thomas,
goodness is identical with act which perfects being to be more in actuality
what it is. If one is man, then it is good to be more a man. If man is a person
who is capable of love, then it is better to love than not to love. Morality is
the obligation issued by the Divine Command to the free being: "Become
who you are!" " '(I)t happens that the reason naturally seizes as a good
everything toward which man has a natural inclination.' The good , then, is
that toward which the real naturally moves; but this is its own realization.
The good is the real fulfilled in being; the good is the real at the goal of its
movement."6
By act we ultimately mean esse.
It will be very important, then, to show what we mean by act, since the
notion of act is going to have to bear the burden of explaining what we
mean by good . To this end I will have recourse to the Thomistic
understanding of "to be", esse, and the configuration esse will take due to
the limiting function of essence, or the form , in the hopes of explaining the
realist grounding of moral obligation. By "limiting configuration", I mean
the particular kind of being limited esse becomes. Esse is not the mere
"facticity" of an essence or a subject but is, rather, all the actuality and
intelligibility there is in a being. That the being be a man who will tend to
love and that the particular act of love-making "should" always be open to
giving life is what I mean by configuration of esse. If esse were not limited to
this or that configuration, it would be God, unlimited esse and hence
incapable or moral activity because there would be no deprivation of act or
November, 1990
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perfection present. There would be no good to be achieved . There is no
"should" in God.
St. Thomas says that, "the good is that which is desirable. And so, since
every nature desires its esse and its perfection , it is necessary to say that esse
and the perfection of any nature whatsoever have the meaning of
goodness."7 The act of existence (esse) is understood by St. Thomas as the
perfection of all perfections, act of all acts. There cannot be any actuality or
perfection of any kind which is not "to be" itself. 8 And so the good is the
actuality of existence at the goal of its movement of becoming. Here I would
like to rehearse Gilson's understanding of being in St. Thomas with regard
to the dynamic of becoming, because it is the esse, in its expansiveness as the
act of acts which tends to achieve itself, i.e., to become itself within the
profile of a particular essence. Again , it is the esse that is the root- of all
goodness. Gilson says:
Not to be, then to act, but: to be is to act. And the very first thing which 'to be'
does , is to make its own essence to be , that is to be a being. This is done at once ,
completely and definitively , for , between to be and not to be , there is no
intermediate position. But the next thing which 'to be' does , is to begin bringing its
own individual essence somewhat nea rer its completion. It begins doing it all at
once, but the work will take time and, in the case of such corporeal beings as men ,
for instance , it is bound to be a slow process. It takes each of us a lifetime to achieve
his own temporal individuality. True enough , essence itself is there from the very
beginning, and, in a way, it is whole , but its wholeness is not that of a thing ... . In
short , the actual perfecting of essences is the final cause of their existences, and it
takes many operations to achieve it.
Existence can perform those operations. Because 10 be is act , it also is to be able
to act. 9

By good, I ultimately mean esse.
If this is true, then the act ofbeing, esse would be the ultimate grounding
of whatever I mean by "good", i.e., by the act of knowing, loving and doing,
I am more man, more in act, more "to be". I am better, i.e., more in act, than
before my esse was actualized from a less intense and relational state lO to
what it is now, i.e., I am more intensely I and I am more far reaching
relationally by knowing and loving, particularly if I am knowing and loving
the greatest of objects, God Himself. This state of actuality toward which I
tend has traditionally been called "good". The act of existence would be
achieving itself according to the specific limitation or intensification of it
which is called essence. This limitation (essence) would be the goal to be
achieved . I am a man , not a tree or a rock. The act of existence which I am ,
at this very moment of writing, is not fully achieved as a man, much less, me.
I must know more and better. I must love more and better. And I must
direct my knowing and loving to the supreme object of knowing and loving,
i.e., God. I must become who I am. Matter would be the principle which
makes space and time possible so that, as an incomplete being, the finite esse
that a person is, could actualize himself/ herself by expanding in knowledge
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and love and intensifying as a self.
Moral objects and the good are determined by esse.
Now, the kinds of acts towards which esse tends in its labor of actualizing
itselffully, and of course, freely, according to the pattern of the essence, e.g.,
worshipping God, honoring parents, respecting life, goods, sexuality,
truthfulness, etc. become what we call "moral objects" and are the criteria as
to whether a particular action is good or not. The moral object is one of the
principal criteria St. Thomas chooses for determining the morality of an
action . He says: "The primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its
suitable object."11 It responds to the question, what are you doing? The
realism involved here is that some moral objects are intrinsically good
because they are clear manifestations of the thrusting of esse in its becoming
more actualized.
The intention is determined by the object.
There is another determinant of the morality of an action which is the
interior act of the will which is the intention. It responds to the question,
why are you doing it? So important is this determinant that even if an action
were good because of its object, such as almsgiving, it would be a bad action
ifthe intention were bad, e.g., if you were looking for praise and position by
the giving of alms. Germane to the purpose of this paper, then, the question
must be raised as to what determines the goodness or badness of intention.
Now, if we have been able to establish that the intrinsic goodness or
badness of an act is determined by its object, which, in turn, is established by
the thrust of the developing esse, on what do I ground the goodness and
badness of why we do such and so? To make the question clearer and more
pertinent, since intention is an act of the will, is goodness or badness
intrinsic to the intention of the will, or is it somehow derived from the kind
of object the person is intending? Is the will simply good or bad in its
intending?, i.e., does it have intuitive goods and evils as part of its make-up?
In answer, St. Thomas states that
the goodness of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is
proposed to it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object
of the will ... Therefore. the goodness of the will depends on reason. in the same
way as it depends on the object. 12

This basically is to say that the goodness of the will is derived from the
kind of act that the intellect, perceptive to the thrusting of esse, presents to
the will and which the will intends.13 Now, there is normally a double
intention of the will in any given moral act: the intention of the object of the
act here and now, and the intention I propose to myselffor doing the act in
the first place. 14 I intend to give alms; and I intend to give alms so as to look
good before men. Now, we saw above that the intention of the act is
November, 1990
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determined by the object of the act . That is , the intention will be good if the
object of the act, the moral object, the act embodying the thrusting of the
esse of the person is good. If almsgiving is good, my intending to give alms is
good. Now, the second intention, the why of the action, the end, the
ultimate purpose that I secretly harbor in my mind and heart, is also
determined in its moral goodness by the object which it intends. IS
Therefore, if I am seeking personal glorification by the giving of alms, it is a
bad act by virtue of the objective disorder of self seeking. The point I am
tryi ng to make , is that the goodness or badness of intention are not intrinsic
to the intention, but are derived from the objective world of being that the
will intends. I want to establish that there is no such thing as a "good" or
"bad" intention in itself but rather intentions of "good" or "bad" kinds of
action. Intentions have derived values. 16 A what is always the foundation of
a why. This sets the stage for understanding that G BFM perhaps have it
backwards and that it is not the contralife will which makes contraception
bad , but the nature of the contraceptive act which makes the intention bad .
Let us let the authors set the stage.
Good as Ungrounded and Underived
The thesis that GBFM propose for the moral evaluation of contraception ·
consists in the evil of the act being derived from the contralife will. That is,
contraception is wrong because it goes against the future child. In their
minds, contraception and homicide are equivalent evils, not because they
both offend grievously against the natural and divine laws, but because they
offend against the same object, i.e ., the living person , or "the basic good of
life", as they would say it: 17 "(contraception) is a practical (though not
necessari ly an emotional) hatred of the possible baby they project and reject
... In short, contraception is similar to deliberate homicide , despite their
important differences, precisely inasmuch as both involve a contralife
will. "18 The authors remove the word "transmission"19 from the definition
of contraception in "Humanae Vitae" (as quoted above) which emphasizes
the nature of the conjugal act as the moral determinant and clearly and
forcefully puts the burden of proof of rightness or wrongness on the
intentionality of the will. I believe that the interpretation of the authors is so
forced that it depends upon an emendation of the very text of "Humanae
Vitae".
The philosophy underlying this position can be found in Grisez's analysis
of SI. Thomas's presentation of The First Principle of Practical Reason in
I-II, Question 94, Article 2,20 It is here that Grisez lays the groundwork for
the autonomy of the practical intellect from all speculative considerations:
" ... to get moral principles from metaphysics, it is not from the is of nat ure
to the ought of nat ure that one must go ... it is no solution to argue that
one can derive the "ought" of moral judgment from the "is" of ethical
evaluation: ... Good is to be done and pursued. and evil is 10 be avoided.
together with the other self-evident princi pies of naturalla w, are not derived
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from any statements offact. They are principles. They are not derived from
any statements at all. They are not derived from prior principles. They are
underivable."21 I believe that we are witnessing the split of the intellect into
theoretical and practical with the practical intellect autonomous unto
itself.22Jt is here that the "goods" are co-relative with the first principles and
themselves stand underived and self evident. They seem to be part and
parcel of the practical intellect as (Grisez suggested earlier in the article)
solubility is a property of sugar 23
Perhaps we could make a small incision here to show how diametrically
opposed Grisez is to a realistic ethic and a faithful interpretation of St.
Thomas. He says :
Our willing of ends requires knowledge of them. and the directive knowledge prior
to the natural movements of our will is precisely the basic principles of practical
reason. At any rate this is Aquinas' theory.""

Now, if what we have said above is true, i.e., the "good" is that act or state
of actuality toward which a limited being tends, (and in a broad sense, we
want to include "willing" under the rubric of "tending"), then there is no
such thing as a "good" prior to inclination (tending or willing). As we can
see at the beginning of the Summa Theologiae: "The essence of goodness
consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. ''25 Therefore, there is no
"directive knowledge prior to the natural movements of our will" as there
are not "basic principles of practical reason" prior to inclination. If there
were, then you would have ungrounded, self-evident "goods" underived
from the perception of the dynamism of real being. And you would have
effectively separated the intellect into theoretical and practical. And, if I
may make the illation , that separation is tantamount to establishing
theoretical subjectivism. I believe such to be the case with Grisez.
Grisez goes on to say that St. Thomas "maintains that there is no willing
without prior apprehension" and quotes I , q. 82, a. 4, ad 3 where St.
Thomas says something quite different:
every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension , whereas every
apprehension is nOI preceded bl' an aCI of lhe will."

But the critical point here is that there are, as we have just seen in I , q. 5, a.
I, c., some apprehensions that are preceded by an act of the will , i.e. , the
good which is being, perceived as desirable, which is such an apprehension.
Grisez goes on to argue in the same paragraph that: "The precepts of natural
law, at least the first principle of practical reason, must be antecedent to all
acts of our will." (emphasis added). The rest of the article continues in the
same vein of equivocation as to the meaning of St. Thomas with regard to
the first principles of the practical intellect. One thing is clear, however: for
Grisez, the good is the direct object of perception by the practical intellect
and is underived from any theoretical considerations ofthe being of reality.
Returning to our concrete consideration of contraception, we are told
that life,26 i.e. , the child , is one of these goods which is a self evident
November, 1990
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apprehension of the practical intellect; hence, the moral reasoning that the
evil of contraception is the will or intention against the good which is the
child.
The Conjugal Act, Not the Child, Is the Object of Intention
Now, with the realist / metaphysical analysis of good as act produced by a
person ("esse-becoming") on the one hand, and the Grisez analysis of good
as underivedfrom being on the other, let us see once again what "Humanae
Vitae" says explicitly in # II :
Each a nd eve ry marriage act ("qualsiasi a tto matrimon iale". as written in the
original Italian ve rsion ; qui/ibet matrimonii usus in the Latin translation) must
remain open ("aperto alia transmissi one della vita"; per se destinatusj to the
transmission of life.

I believe this statement represents the terms in which not only contraception
is immoral, but it is presenting the criterion for the moral evaluation of all
sexual activity: the openness of each and every marriage act to the
transmission of life. Notice, the document explicitly establishes the act, with
its double dimension of love-making /l ife-giving, as the criterion of all
sexual moral evaluation, beginning with contraception. We also saw that
the position of G BFM puts contraception squarely within the interiority of
the agent as being "essentially a contra-life will" (p. 40). They separate
contraception from any relationship to the sexual act < "Assuming
contraception is a sin, it is not a sexual sin" (p . 41», and finally conclude
that : "Contraception can be defined only in terms of the beliefs, intentions,
and choices that render behavior contraceptive" (p. 41). They even go so far
as to say that
This definition 2) makes it clear that contraception is only contingent/r related to
marital intercourse. For the definition of contraception neither includes norentai/s
that one \\'ho does it engages in sexual intercourse, much less marital intercourse.
Therefore. if someone bo th engages in a sex ual act and contracept s. the two are
distinct acts (r. 42).

The point here is that the criterion of morality is intrinsic to the will , i.e. ,
the intending of the life of the child, a nd underi ved from any metaphysical
considerations such as reality itself. There is simply no derivation of ought
from is. The morality of the act does not depend on the nature of the act but
on the intention of the life of the child.
A Critique of the authors' position.
Now, according to the text and mora l rea son ing of"Humanae Vitae" # 11
as well as axiomatic realism in mora l analysis, I do not believe we are
talking of the child as the criterion of morality in contraception. As we saw,
there may be a double intention in the performance of an act; that of the act
itself2 8 , and that of an ulterior purpose for performing the act 29 . This
ulterior intentionality could destroy the moral goodness of the act and hence
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it seems to lend support to what GBFM roundly affirm; i.e., that it is the
contralife intention which makes contraception to be a bad act. But there
are two considerations that militate against it.
One. the morality of the intention is always determined by the kind of
action we are talking about, whether it be the proximate intention of the act
itself or the remote intention of the end which the agent purposes. If it is a
good kind of action, it is a good intention. And the kind of action is
determined by the nature of the being we are dealing with. The moral
evaluation is always derived. And, again, this holds true for both intentions,
that ofthe act and that of the end. For both intentions, the "what" explains
the moral quality of the "why".
Dr. Janet E. Smith voices this same point concerning contraception as
contra-life in her forthcoming book on contraception (Appendix 4, p. 10).
She says:
Grisez seems to lose sight of the traditional understanding that the will becomes
evil when it wills an evil act and that the evil of acts - at lesat those considered
intrinsically immoral - can be assessed apart from and prior to knowledge of
what the agent wills. It is because the agent intends to do an action that is evil that
he has an evil will ; it is not because he has an evil will that his external action is evil
(in fact. on occasion the external act may be good while the will is evil.) A more
traditional formulation would state that 'The malice of contraception is in the
intention because the will intends to do an action that is intrinsically evil and the
goodness or evil of the will depends primarily upon the object of the act.' As we
shall see in our consideration of Grisez's latest explanation of the malice of
contraception . Grisez seems to place the malice ever more exclusively in the will.

When considering that explanation, i.e. , that the will becomes evil when
intending an evil act. Dr. Smith observes that GBFM
seem most reluctant to state that contraception is wrong because it is a contralife
act; they persist in locating the evil in the will. In their view. since to have a
contralife will is wrong. contraception (since it involves a contralife) is wrong. But
this seems to be backward. It ",auld seem to be because contraception is an action
that is contrali(e that one v. ·ho intends itIor what it is could be said to ha ve a
contrali(e will. (emphasis added"lo

It may be helpful to show that the claim that the evil of an action resides
primarily in the will seems to conflict with received Catholic teaching. Let
me cite the famous passage from "Gaudium et Spes," #51:
When it is a question of harmon izing married love with the responsible
transmission of life . it is not enough to take only the good intention and the
evaluation of motives into account; the objective criteria must be used, criteria
drawn fro m the nature of the human person and human action. criteria which
respect the total meaning of mutual self-giving and human procreation in the
context of true love ;

Two. to have a contralife will does not vitiate the moral quality of the
conjugal act. Let us rehearse that a bit.
As long as the conjugal act is intended as the act it is (love-making and
openness to the transmission of life), the will can be ultimately contralife,
November. 1990
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without making a good conjugal act bad for that reason. Why? Because
there is a built-in sterility, a window in the act which can be taken advantage
offor serious reasons but which does not negate the procreative orientation
of the act. The non-intending of children does not necessarily violate the
kind of act intercourse is . "The act they perform is a generative sort of act:
even if it has not a procreative function (because of its being infertile), it
nevertheless maintains its procreative meaning. If this act, for natural
reasons beyond intention, cannot have procreative efficiency, this does not
alter what one intentionally does (what one chooses) as long as one did not
do (choose) anything for preventing procreation.") I That means that a
couple may not want children but they do nothing to prevent them. They
engage freely in the conjugal act and take what comes. We could say that the
intentionality for life, as the "procreative meaning", is embedded in the very
nature of the act as flowing from the esse of the conjugal partners. It is in the
physiology of the act. (And this is not physicalism since the body pertains to
the person as an expression of the person.) The physiology of sex and
reproduction is an expression of the dynamics of the persons. Or, for a
proportionally grave reason, they positively do not want children now, and
they discipline themselves to practice NFP. They struggle energetically and
ascetically discipline themselves to show love for each other in other ways,
limiting the use of the conjugal act to the infertile periods. They have a
contralife will here and now and, indeed, positively grow in holiness with
it32 . We could say that the intentionality for the child is within the act itself.
But that does not make the child the object of the intention of the moral
agent.)) Rather, the child is excluded as the intention of the conjugal
partners. But he or she is included in the overall meaning of the conjugal act
which would make him l her the object of the intention of God by the very
overall orientation (intentio Dei) of the conjugal act. We enter here into the
distinction of the finis operis and the finis operantis. The act of the persons ,
then, as mutual self-giving, love-making, is the object of the first intention,
the finis operantis. The openness to the transmission of life inscribed in the
act itself as an embodiment of the esse-becoming of the persons is the finis
operis which is the second intention. And the moral rightness of that act
depends, not on the intention of having a child. which would be the third
intention , but on whether the act of intercourse is performed according to
its nature . The conjugal act, as the enfleshed performance of the mutual
self-giving of the persons with its inherent ope'nness to life, is the object of
intention and the criterion of sexual morality.
As we saw, there are two objects of intention in the act: to make love and
to be open to the child . As we just saw, there are three . The first two are
involved in the conjugal act itself as love-making and life-giving, as
dimensions of the act, and the third , which we analyzed above, which is the
child himself. Again, the point being made, is that the intention against the
child does not render the intended naturally sterile act wrong, provided
there is an objectively serious and proportionate "reason". Again, the word
"reason" here means a further "intention" (a fourth) obviously pointing
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to an objective grounding in being which would justify not wanting the child
here and now. Therefore, it seems that the position of Grisez et al. does not
stand up to an analysis of intention as being grounded in being nor to the
moral validity of NFP.
Attention must be turned from the intention, or the contralife will , to the
nature of the act to morally evaluate contraception . It is true , as we saw
above, that the morality of the external act depends on the will, the "heart",
the intention. But the will, heart and intention are in turn determined, are
made "good" if, what is interiorly willed, yearned for and intended , is
objectively an act perfective of real existing persons. The child may be
intended along with the proper performance of the conjugal act, but it is not
the intending of the child which makes the act moral , but the intending of
the openness while intending the love act.
My discrepancy with the authors is not their conclusions which, in fact,
conform, albeit contingently, with the reality of things and the teaching of
the Church. Rather, if I ma y borrow a phrase from Dr. Janet Smith, it is
with "the technicalities a/moral analysis. i.e. , on the relation of the malice
of the will to the evil of the external act and on what role nature plays in this
analysis."34
Incompatibility of invincible ignorance with intention as sole moral
criterion.
In the case of invincible ignorance, agai n, it is Dr. Janet Smith who
suggests that we also consider the sadly universal situation where
uninformed and erroneously counseled women may use contraceptives
oblivious to any objective moral wrongdoing. They are invincibly ignorant
and presume that, since they are generally open to life or are concerned
about the "quality of life", they can and "should" use contraceptives.
Indeed, they may have a contraceptive will in this act, but then we are not
talking about a contra-life will but a will that is contra nalUram . That is,
they will life , but not now in this act. This is also a refutation of the basic
thesis of the authors. If a person is in invincible ignorance and performs the
objectively sinful act of contraception, which has the objective negative
results of preventing both the complete giving of self in the conjugal act
because the union of egg and seed is withheld, and also simultaneously
impedes the conception of a child , the y are clearly doing something wrong.
But it is not because they intend it . but because they are ignorant of it. True,
there is no formal evil norant of it. True, there is no formal evil being done ,
but there is certainly material evil and damage. This can only be imputed to
the violation of the nature of the act, not the intention .
Moral situations highlighting the act as moral criterion.
Let us now consider a series of situations, e.g., the mirror image of
contraception which is artificial insemination. There is an explicit intention
for the child , but we do not have the act of love whereby the child is
November, 1990
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engendered. 35 I would submit this as a devastating argument against the
intention of the will as the ultimate grounding of the morality of the act.
Here you have a completely pro-life will while totally bypassing the act of
intercourse. The act is censured in the strongest terms by the highest
magisterium of the Church.
Or again, let us consider the case of homosexuality, where what is absent
is an act which should be "a complementary union, able to transmit life". 36
Homosexuals are incapable of total self-giving which can occur only in
marriage . "Sexual intercourse between homosexuals cannot represent total
self-giving because they are not able , by the very fact of their being of the
same sex , to give their fertility to one another."37
Or we may have the couple who has the intention of the child, but not in
every single act of intercourse. The overall intentionality is life and children,
but not, say, in this act here and now. I would again submit that it is not the
intention for the child that determines the morality of the act, but the act
itself as perfective of the dimensions of personhood, viz. , love-making/ lifegiving. The physical act itself, as the bodily expression of the persons, is the
principal determinant of morality because the body "is a constitutive part of
the person who manifests and expresses himself/ herself through it.
Therefore, the 'natural moral law' (recall that this refers to the truth about
what it means to be a human person, the 'law of personhood') also applies to
what is done to and by the human body. It requires that bodily acts not
violate the dignity of personhood . That is, it requires that the physical acts
of the human being respect the reality of personhood as gift. What is done to
a human body is done directly or indirectly to a human person. Therefore,
although the 'natural moral law' is not a biological law, it requires that
human beings direct and regulate their bodily behavior, so as to be faithful
to their nature as persons. The Instruction applies this requirement to the
'bio-spiritual' act of human procreation."38
Therefore, the moral criterion for all sexual activity is not "life" as the
good , but the "esse-becoming", or if you will, the nature of the intercoursing
married male and female persons which issue in a "bio-spiritual" act of
intercourse. 39 Contraception would be wrong because there is no openness
to the transmission of life in the act. Artificial insemination would be wrong
because there would be no act of union. Homosexuality would be wrong
because there is no possibility for an act which could be a procreative
(fertile) giving of self. Sporadic contraceptive acts concomitant with a
general openness to children would be wrong because each act is a human
act and therefore free . It is for this reason that the Church , in her explicit
teaching,40 insists that "each and every marriage act must remain open to
the transmission of life." And so it is the act which embodies the moral
object insofar as it (the act) is the expression of "esse-becoming" of the
persons. And, again, this act is not a mere external physicalism of biological
laws, but is, rather, the act of bodies which are the enfleshment of persons.
And so the bodily act is a person-act with the morality of personhood
inscribed within it.
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If life is proposed as the criterion by GBFM , it is proposed as a
consequence. What we may have here is a full blown consequentialism
which is masked and "impeded" by simply stonewalling it; i.e., declaring the
goods to be "incommensurable", to be absolutes. This is done simply by
platonizing them, lifting them out of the contingency of real situations. This
in turn is done by bypassing the act itself and, of course, the "essebecoming" of persons on whom the act depends. The reality of the moral
agent and the reality of situations is simply taken out of play in order to
avoid situationism and an ethic of consequences. The logical result is that
there can be no prudential judgment, say, concerning life . For example, war
and capital punishment would be ipso facto immoral if life , not person-acts,
be the criterion of morality.
I opened a parenthesis when I made a brief presentation of Grisez's mind
concerning the underived nature of the "goods" and the first principles of
the practical intellect. I would like to close that parenthesis by explicitly
affirming that my making the "esse-becoming" of the persons and the
ensuing conjugal act the moral object of all sexual activity, I am affirming
the continuity - the identity - of the theoretical and the practical intellect.
And I am using the word "derived" in a wider sense than Grisez. I am not
just talking about secondary principles of natural law being "derived" from
primary principles. I am suggesting that the entire content of the intellect, as
theoretical and practical, is derived; that the intellect is nothing with regard
to reality prior to its being informed by being. That is , without the
perception of a being, there would be no theoretical principles of identity,
causality, etc. And without the perception in the self of the dynamic of esse
reaching toward its fulfilled actualization, the intellect would not even be
practical. There would not be any first practical principle such as "good is to
be done and evil avoided" because it is axiomatic that the intellect perceive
only act, and that it call "good" only that further actuality and perfection
toward which act tends . "Good" as such is not self-evident to the practical
intellect divorced from the theoretical perception of being-becoming.
"Good", "ought", the first principles of the natural law such as: "good
should be done and evil avoided", etc ., are not innate to the practical
intellect. This is axiomatic to realism. On this fundamental point let Grisez's
position be clear. He says: "The basic precepts of natural law are no less part
of the mind's original equipment than are the evident principles of
theoretical knowledge. Ought requires no special act legitimatizing it; ought
rules its own domain by its own authority, an authority legitimate as that of
any is'' .4 1
Conclusion
G BFM no doubt, see their work as a first line defense against relativism
(in the form of consequentialism or proportionalism or situationism). We
have to thank them for this. They are giving us an absolute by affirming the
"goods" as "incommensurables", but perhaps at the price of losing a
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grounding in reality. My disagreements with GBFM are not about the
strength of their moral reasoning, nor the truth of the conclusions they
reach . As Dr. Janet Smith says: "I find them both strong and true." The real
problem is the moral reasoning as to whether good or evil are inherent to the
will or grounded on being. I proposed at the beginning of the paper that the
position of GBFM is ultimately an epistemological problem of the
derivation of the "goods". The authors reject this derivation. I submit that
this is a disguised subjectivism. They would not agree, however. This is not
because they are theoretically realists, but because the intellect cannot help
thinking in an essentially realisitc way,42 and they perceive themselves as
realists . Theoretically, however, they have distanced themselves from
realism with the separation of "ought" from "is" and have made the "goods"
a dimension, "equipment"43 of the practical intellect. This is idealism. And
idealism is ultimately ethical subjectivism. Commenting on this type of
procedure, E. Gilson commented: "Thus one must be also cautious to turn
himself away from any speculation on 'values'. Values (read here the
"goods") are nothing other than transcendentals which have separated
themselves from being and try to substitute themselves for it. The 'founding
of values' thus becomes an obsession for the idealist; but for the realist,
nothing."44
Therefore , I think ethical theory would be better served by a reevaluation of St. Thomas's esse or as I am suggesting, "esse-becoming", i.e.,
the person, as the ultimate ground of realism, which, as finite outside of
God , is , in some respect, absolute in itself, as the act of existence, yet still
contingent, becoming itself and always in a context and a situation. The
"esse-becoming" is the grounding of the nature of the conjugal act which is
the centerpiece of all sexual morality. In this wise, we have an absolute
reality-in context that must be evaluated in a prudential judgment in order
to determine what is good here and now. If we bypass esse, we run the risk of
seeking an absolute in idealistic terms, (the goods), and in this case, the
child , and building an ethic of intentionality around it which cannot end in
other than subjectivism and ideology.
Perhaps we could profit from the experience of Josef Pieper:
It was 28 August 1924. Goethe's birthday - which is why I cannot possibly forget
the date . . . At that very moment . all the ideas which had long been striving to
achieve structural unity in the murk y ferment of toilsome reflection suddenly
crystallized as if under magical influence. All at once I was able to put my confused
intimations into clear words : "Every ought is grounded in an is ; the good is wha t
corresponds to reality." If anyone wants to know and do the good, he must direct
his gaze to the objective world of being; not to his own mind, not to his own
conscience, not to values, nor to ideals or paradigms he has himself drawn up . He
must look away from his own act and toward reality.4s
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